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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for this appeal from the First Circuit
Court of Box Elder County, Brigham City Department to the
Court of Appeals is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
Section 78-2A-3.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.
Where the arresting officer properly stopped the
vehicle with reasonable suspicion that the driver was
operating the vehicle without a valid driver's license, was
the request that the driver produce his driver's license
reasonably related in scope to the initial s^top?

II.
Does UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-2-124 permit a request for
production of a valid driver's license wher^ the initial
stop of the vehicle was made with the requirjed reasonable
suspicion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from defendant's convections in the
First Circuit Court of Box Elder County,
1

Br[Lgham City

Department, the Honorable Robert W. Daines, presiding.
Defendant, Steven W. Murphy, was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol and driving on suspension.
Defendant, Darrell R. Murhpyf was convicted of illegal
possession of alcohol.

Defendants appeal these convictions

upon the grounds that the trial court erred in not granting
defendants' motion to suppress all of the evidence.

Judge

Stanton Taylor denied the Motion to Suppress preceding the
trial before Judge Daines.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A narrative written by the arresting officer states the
facts upon which the trial court relied in ruling on the
Motion to suppress the evidence.

A copy of this narrative

is attached to the appellantfs brief in the addendum.
On October 3/ 1986 the arresting officer received a
radio call which informed him that another officer had seen
a vehicle belonging to Darrell Murphy, and he believed
Darrell was driving on suspension.

The arresting officer

confirmed that Darrell Murphy's license had been suspended,
proceeded to the indicated area, and observed the vehicle.
He stated that as the suspect vehicle turned in front of
him, his headlights illuminated the inside of the vehicle,
and it appeared to him that the driver was Darrell.

Based

upon this, the arresting officer stopped the vehicle.
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When the officer approached the vehicle and spoke with
the driver, he ascertained it was Steven Murphy and that
Darrell Murphy was the passenger.

Both of these brothers

appeared in court, and it is beyond dispute that their
physical similarities are so close they could pass for
identical twins.

They are the same size, build and

complexions, and they have the same hair stjyle and hair
length.
At this point the arresting officer explained the
reason for the stop and requested the driver, Steven Murphy,
to provide a driver's license.

Steven responded that he did

not have his license with him.

The arresting officer

checked the status of Steven's license through his
dispatcher and was informed that Steven's license had been
suspended and the vehicle registration had expired more than
90 days previously.

This was actually the second time

Steven's license had been suspended.

The first time for an

accumulation of speeding and reckless driving violations,
the second time for hit and run and alcohol violations.
When the arresting officer returned to the vehicle, he
noticed the smell of alcohol coming from Steven's breath and
later noticed a similar smell from Darrell's breath.

Both

failed the field sobriety tests and the intoMlyzer tests.
Darrell Murphy was a minor at this time, born January 13,
1967.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The arresting officer was justified in stopping
defendant's vehicle, when the officer had reasonable
suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle with a
suspended driver's license.

The initial stop of the vehicle

was not an unreasonable intrusion on defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.

Once a proper initial stop was made, the

officer could request production of a driver's license.
This action is reasonably related in scope to the initial
stop on suspicion of driving without a valid license.

UTAH

CODE ANNOTATED, §41-2-124, permits the officer to request
production of a driver's license, when the initial stop is
justifiably made.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE ARRESTING OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE
INITIAL STOP WITH REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE
DRIVER WAS DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED DRIVER'S LICENSE.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . " Whenever an individual may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free
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from unreasonable government intrusion.

Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).

Of course, what

the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures,
but unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968).

In determining whether the

seizure and search were unreasonable the inquiry is a dual
one —

whether the officer's action was justified at its

inception, and whether it was reasonable related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interjference in the
first place.

Ld. at 19.

In this instance it is uncontested that the arresting
officer's action was justified at its inception. He
observed the vehicle, saw the driver, and
driver may have been driving on suspension.

irmed that the
Clearly, the

arresting officer possessed the required reasonable
suspicion which justified him in making the initial stop of
the vehicle to check for the violation of driving on a
suspended license.

The stop was not an unreasonable

intrusion.
POINT II.
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S REQUEST TO PRODUCE A
DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS REASONABLY RELATED IN SCOPE
TO THE INITIAL STOP ON SUSPICION OF THE DRIVER
OPERATING ON A SUSPENDED DRIVER'S LICENSE.
We turn now to the second part of the dual inquiry

—

whether the officerfs action was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.

The permissibility of a particular law
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enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
Prousef 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979).

Delaware v.

In this case

the individual's interests must be balanced against the
State's interests in promoting public safety upon its roads
by insuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted
to operate motor vehicles, and hence that licensing
requirements are being observed.
Courts have looked at the reasonableness of a request
for a driver's license once a justified initial stop has
been made.

In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct.

1921 (1972), the United States Supreme Court said in dictum:
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the
officer at the time." Id_. at 146.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii followed this approach in
State v. Powell, 603 P2d 143 (Hawaii 1979), where a police
officer stopped a vehicle believing that the driver was
either lost, experiencing mechanical difficulties, or
intoxicated.

After ruling that the intrusion of the initial

stop was reasonable and that the officer had the required
reasonable suspicion, the court stated the following in its
holding:
"(H)aving determined that the initial stop of
appellee's vehicle was justified, we also believe that
it was reasonable for the officer to request to see
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appellee's driver's license. When investigating a
possible violation of a traffic law, an officer may
properly ask a driver to display his license so that he
may, in the first instance, determine I who he is dealing
with and whether such person is qualified to drive."
In Powell as in the present case, the police officer upon
stopping the driver simply requested the driver to produce
his driver's license.

The officer's request for the driver

to produce a driver's license was reasonably related in
scope to the initial stop to investigate a suspicious
situation.
Two Arizona courts have ruled similarlV.

In State v.

Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201 (Ariz. 1975), the
patrolman stopped the vehicle when he suspected that the
turn signals were inoperative.

He asked for the driver's

license and registration, and the driver wa^ unable to
produce either.

On appeal the Arizona Suprdme Court held

that the evidence should not be suppressed stating that "a
police officer may first request the driver's license and
registration before conducting a safety inspection."

The

Arizona Court of Appeals followed the Puig holding in State
vs. Gradillas, 25 Ariz. App. 510, 544 P.2d 1111 (1976),
where the officer noted suspicious behavior, saw no
expiration date on a temporary registration sticker, and
stopped the vehicle.

After ruling that the initial stop was

reasonable the court held, citing Puig, that "the officer
had the right upon stopping the vehicle, to immediately
demand production of the driver's license and registration."
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The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the officer had
the right to ascertain the driver's name (by production of
driver's license) and to ascertain ownership of the car,
when the officer approached the car to determine if the
occupants were having car trouble.
P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
suspicion of criminal behavior.

People v. Davis, 565

The officer had no
Similarly, the Oregon Court

of Appeals in a per curiam opinion held that a police
officer, after pulling in behind a driver's
apparently-disabled vehicle, may request to see a driver's
license.

State v. Thornton, 62 Or.App. 468, 661 P.2d 555

(1983).
In the present case, the arresting officer's request to
see a driver's license was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances justifying the initial stop.

Since the

initial stop was justified, the officer should be able to
request production of a driver's license, as was allowed in
the above cited cases.

Certainly, a request for a driver's

license is reasonably related to the suspicion that the
driver is operating on a suspended license.

In the first

instance the officer should be allowed to determine who he
is dealing with and whether that person is qualified to
drive.
POINT III.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-2-124 PERMITS A
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
WHEN THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN STOPPED JUSTIFIABLY.
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Utah Code Annotated §41-2-124 subsection (1) provides
that "the licensee shall have his license in his immediate
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and
shall display it upon demand of a justice o|f peace, a peace
officer, or a field deputy or inspector of the division."
i

The clear intent of this statute is simply to permit the
officer to demand the license

of the driver whose vehicle

has been stopped for an otherwise proper purpose.

See

People vs. McPherson, 550 P.2d 311 (Colo. Ct.App. 1976)
("The demand for defendant to present his license was proper
only if the officers properly stopped him in the first

I
place").

This reasonable intrusion is not only permissible

but necessary in order to give effect to the statute
requiring the carrying of a driver's license].

Noncompliance

with licensing requirements are not effectively detectable
or deferrable without some form of on-the-spot inspection
procedure.

Therefore, the arresting officer in the present

case appropriately requested production of a driver's
license, when the vehicle was properly stopped.
POINT IV.
THE RULE IN THE PRESENT CASE IS APPLICABLE TO
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A PROPER INITIAL STCJP WAS
MADE, AND DOES NOT APPLY TO ARBITRARY Sl{OPS
TO CHECK FOR PROPER DRIVER'S LICENSE.
Appellant cites authority from cases thajt are factually
not on point with the present case*
factual situations where the

The casejs involve

initial stop by the officer
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was made in an arbitrary manner, without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

See Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307
A.2d 875 (Pa. 1973); State v. Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d
1097 (Ariz. 1976).

The present case involves a proper

initial stop and request for production of driver's license.
Respondant does not suggest that officers should be allowed
to stop vehicles without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, rather that after a proper stop the officer should
be allowed to request to see the driver's license of the
operator.

CONCLUSION
The arresting officer properly requested the driver to
produce a valid driver's license, after the officer had made
a justifiable stop of the driver's vehicle on reasonable
suspicion that driver was operating with a suspended
license.

Therefore, the trial court appropriately refused

to grant defendants' Motion to Suppress and defendants'
convictions should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of October, 1987.

Ben H. Hadfield

Phillip W. Hadfield
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the
foregoing Respondantfs Brief to the followina:
Michael L. Miller
Attorney for Defendant
20 South Main
P. 0. Box 399
Brigham City, Utah 84302
postage prepaid this

day of

Ben H. Hadfield
Attorney for
Plaint if f/Res|?ondant
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, 1987.

ADDENDUM
41-2-124.

License to be carried when operating motor
vehicle -- Production in court.

(1) The licensee shall have his license in his
immediate possession at all times when operating a motor
vehicle and shall display it upon demand of a justice of
peace, a peace officer, or a field deputy or inspector of
the division.
(2) It is a defense to a charge under this section
that the person charged produces in court a license issued
to him and valid at the time of his citation or arrest.
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